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The literature has identified at least five approaches to the determinants of the choice of 
exchange rate regimes: i) optimal currency area theory; ii) exchange rate policy and the 
absortion of real and nominal shocks; iii) exchange rate rules as a policy crutch in 
credibility-challenged economies; iv) the impossible trinity in light of increasing financial 
globalization; and v) the balance sheet exposure to exchange rate changes in financially 
dollarized economies. Using both a de facto and a de jure regime classification, we test 
the empirical relevance of these approaches simultaneously. We find overall empirical 
support for all of them, although their relative relevance varies substantially between 
industrial and non-industrial economies. We show that regime choices, as well as 
deviations between actual and reported policies, can be accurately predicted by a small 
number of economic and political characteristics of each country.  When regimes are 
correctly characterized, they display no time trend, suggesting that the trends typically 
highlighted in the exchange rate regime debate can be traced back to the evolution of 
their natural determinants. 
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For open economies the choice of exchange rate regimes has always been a crucial policy 
decision. As a result, the relative merits of fixed versus flexible exchange rates have been 
the subject of continuous attention. The rage with fixed exchange rates prevalent in the 
first half of the 90s (in great part due to their presumed beneficial effects on inflation), 
drastically reverted after the stream of crises that started with the devaluation of the 
Mexican peso in 1994, which casted doubt on the sustainability of conventional pegs and 
other intermediate regimes.
1 Indeed, as a result, a new consensus has been growing, both 
in policy and academic circles, around a bipolar view that poses the exchange rate debate 
largely in terms of a credibility vs. flexibility dilemma, contrasting the stabilizing effects 
of a superfixed regime (hence, the emphasis on currency boards and unilateral 
dollarization as commitment mechanisms) with the traditional Mundellian arguments in 
favor of full exchange rate flexibility.
2 
 
Yet much of the discussion (and most empirical literature) on the evolution and 
implications of different exchange rate regimes has tended to view the regime choice as a 
decision independent from country-specific characteristics and the regional and 
international situation at the moment the choice is being made.
3 Such a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach seems at odds with both casual evidence and conventional wisdom, which 
would caution against a judgement on the relative merits and the economic implications 
of regimes that does not take into account the fact that regimes are themselves 
endogenous to the local and global economic contexts.
4 
 
Not that the endogeneity of exchange rate regimes has gone unnoticed in the economic 
literature, a large body of which has provided key insights on the potential determinants 
of the regime choice.
  But, to our knowledge, the empirical exploration of these 
determinants have been partial, focusing on a particular hypothesis or group of countries, 
                                                 
1 The fall from grace of pegs is probably not independent from the increasing unwillingness of international 
financial institutions to foot the resources needed to sustain what they have tended to see as ultimately 
unsustainable exchange rates. 
2 On the bipolar view, see Fischer (2001), Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001a), and references therein. 
Examples of pro-fix arguments can be found in Calvo (1999, 2002), Hausmann (1999) and Hausmann et al. 
(2000). For pro-flex arguments, see, e.g., Chang and Velasco (2000). 
3 A notable exception is Obstfeld and Taylor (2002), who link the evolution of exchange rate arrangements 
to the historical phases of financial globalization, based on the Mundellian “impossible trinity” proposition 
that maintains that, under free capital mobility, no country can consistently pursue a fixed exchange rate 
and an autonomous monetary policy. Obstfeld and Taylor explain that, while capital mobility has prevailed 
at a time when monetary policy was subordinated to exchange rate stability (as in the gold standard), when 
countries attempted to use monetary policy to revice the economy in the interwar period, they had to 
impose controls to curtail capital movements. Inverting their argument, the current trend towards financial 
globalization, fueled by increased financial sophistication, by reducing the capacity to impose capital 
control, may have shifted the focus of the exchange rate debate. On the same point see Bordo and 
Flandreau (2001).  
4 For example, one can conceive reasons behind the well-documented fact that small open economies tend 
to be more prone to peg. Similarly, the move towards more flexible regimes in Mexico or many East Asian 
countries is better understood as the result of contemporaneous events in international financial markets 
rather than as a meditated change of heart on the part of the monetary authorities.   3




This paper tries to fill this gap by discussing the determinants of the exchange rate 
regimes in such a comprehensive way. Thus, its contribution lies not only in the use of 
several alternative data sets, but, more importantly, on the nesting of what we regard as 
the main theoretical views on the determinants of exchange rate regimes in a common 
framework that allows us to test them jointly, unveiling the relative relevance of each one 
of them. 
 
The paper introduces an additional novelty. In addition to the standard de jure 
classification of exchange rate regimes prepared by the IMF based on the periodic reports 
from the country’s monetary authorities, it uses a de facto classification compiled by 




Both classifications are used to test, simultaneously, the relevance of what we believe are 
the main five competing approaches to the choice of exchange rate regimes: i) the 
Optimal Currency Area (OCA) theory pioneered by Mundell (1961), which relates the 
choice of regime to the country’s trade links, size and degree of openness; ii) the real-
nominal variability tradeoff dating back to the work of Poole (1970); iii) the view of pegs 
as “policy crutches” for governments lacking (nominal and institutional) credibility; iv) 
the impossible trinity view which stresses the role of financial integration and capital 
mobility as a factor limiting the effectiveness of pegs,
 7 and v) the implications of balance 
sheet effects on the costs of exchange rate variability in financially dollarized economies.  
 
Our overall results indicate strong support for the OCA, policy crutch, impossible trinity 
and balance sheet effects, while the nominal-real tradeoff appears to be an important 
determinant only for industrial countries where other aspects are relatively less relevant. 
Reassuringly, results using the de jure classification, while less precise, lead to a similar 
diagnostic. 
 
An examination of the mismatches between de jure and de facto regimes is consistent 
with the thrust of our basic results and what was to be expected from the literature. In 
particular, fear of floating (that is, reported floats that actually intervene to reduce 
exchange rate fluctuations) appears to be associated with the prevalence of balance sheets 
effects and nominal shocks. In turn, fear of pegging (that is, de facto pegs that choose not 
to commit explicitely to a fixed parity) increases with financial development (as countries 
are more exposed to speculative attacks) and with the prevalence of flexible regimes 
within the region (itself correlated with the probability of destabilizing exchange rate 
misalignments vis à vis the main trading partners).  
 
                                                 
5 Many empirical papers study the determinants behind the choice of exchange rate regime. See, among 
others, Dreyer (1978), Heller (1978), Holden et al (1979), Melvin (1985) and, more recently, Collins 
(1996), Edwards (1996), Haussman et al (1999), Poirson (2001) and Rizzo (1998). 
6 To our knowledge, the only attempt to use a de facto classification to study the determinants of regime 
choices is Poirson (2001), who uses a variation of Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger’s approach to construct an 
exchange rate flexibility index. 
7 See, among many others, Rose (1996) and Fischer (2001).   4
Finally, by recovering the time dummies used in the baseline regression, we can study 
whether the evolution of regimes display a particular time pattern beyond and above that 
associated with the set of controls. We find that the time dummies display no discernible 
pattern, suggesting that the trends typically highlighted in the recent exchange rate regime 
debate (towards the float extreme, or, in the case of the bipolar view, away from the 
middle ground) can be traced back to those embedded in the evolution of their natural 
determinants.  
 
In sum, we conclude that a few fundamental characteristics of a country determine, to a 
great extent, the choice of exchange rate regime. Whatever the ultimate relevance of 
exchange rate regimes on economic performance is, ignoring or not fully understanding 
the role played by these variables and relying on fix-all recommendations may induce ill-
advised policies.  
 
 
II. The Theoretical Determinants of Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
As mentioned before, our exploration of the determinants of exchange rate regimes will 
be centered around five main approaches that we divide into two broad groups: traditional 
and modern. Traditional approaches that have long been part of the open economies 
macroeconomics toolkit include the theory of optimal currency areas (OCA), and the 
Mundell-Flemming-Dornbusch real vs. nominal shock approach. Modern takes on the 
exchange rate regime problem include the political economy view of pegs as policy 
crutches for weak governments with poor track records, the balance sheet view that 
stresses the costs of exchange rate fluctuations in financially dollarized economies, and 
the impossible trinity view that ties the costs of running a fix regime to the degree of 
capital mobility and financial integration.
8 We review each of them in turn.  
 




The first group of factors potentially underpinning the choice of regime is related with 
geographical and trade characteristics identified by the theory of optimal currency areas. 
This approach to the fix vs. float dilemma weights the trade and welfare gains from a 
stable exchange rate vis à vis the rest of the world (or, more precisely, the country’s main 
trade partners) against the benefits of exchange rate flexibility as a shock adjuster in the 
presence of nominal rigidities. 
 
According to this argument, the country characteristics that favor a more stable (or fixed) 
exchange rate are: i) openness, which enhances trade gains derived from stable bilateral 
exchange rates, ii) smallness, through its effect on openness, given the usually higher 
propensity of small economies to trade internationally, and iii) geographical 
concentration of a country’s trade,  which increases the gains from pegging the currency 
                                                 
8 As noted below, the impossible trinity concept dates back at least to the work of Mundell in the 1960s. 
However, the argument that conventional middle-of-the-ground pegs have become increasingly costly due 
to growing capital mobility in the post Bretton-Woods period is relatively recent.   5
to that of the main trading partner
9. As noted, OCA theory suggests that the sign of the 
relationship between these determinants and the propensity to fix should be positive in all 
cases. 
 
In order to test this hypothesis we relate the exchange rate regime to two different 
measures of size, namely, physical size, measured as land area, (AREA) and economic 
size (SIZE), measured as the country’s GDP relative to that of the US, and we measure 
openness by using the lagged GDP share of exports plus imports (OPEN1).
10 In order to 
measure geographical concentration we use the lagged share of exports to the major 
partner (SHTRADE1). 
 
Regional exchange rate policy coordination is also a relevant component of the OCA 
story. Everything else equal, the more fixed are exchange rate arrangements in the region 
(against the regional reference currency), the larger the trade-related cost of exchange rate 
variability. On the other hand, successive competitive devaluations increase the 
incentives of the remaining pegs to adjust accordingly (by realigning the exchange rate or 
directly floating the home currency). This suggests that the regime of individual countries 
should be correlated to the average regime of its main trading partners. A large literature 
that stresses the negative correlation between exchange rate variability and trade warns us 
against the use of a trade-weighted regime average. Instead, we use the neighbors´ 
average regime (LYSAVG) as a proxy for bilateral exchange rate volatility vis à vis the 
main trade partners.
11 We expect that a higher number of pegs in the region increase the 
attractiveness of fixing. 
 
Regimes as Shock Absorbers (Nominal vs. Real Tradeoffs) 
 
From the traditional Mundell-Flemming-Dornbusch framework we obtain the familiar 
argument that, in order to minimize output fluctuations, fixed (flexible) exchange rates 
are to be preferred if nominal (real) shocks are the main source of disturbance in the 
economy.
12 As a result, one should expect that the choice of exchange rate regime should 
depend, to a certain extent, on the importance of real relative to monetary shocks. For 
example, high volatility of terms of trade, or other external shocks, would provide a 
rationale for a float.
13  Moreover, as real shocks become increasingly important due to 
                                                 
9 Geographical concentration of a country’s trade is expected to be positively related with the propensity to 
fix, since when a country’s trade is concentrated in one major partner there are more benefits of pegging to 
the currency of that partner. This criterion seems to apply both to the European countries coordinating their 
exchange rates around the DM prior to EMU, as well as to countries in the accession list to EMU. 
Similarly, many authors have highlighted the propensity of Central American countries to peg to the US 
dollar based on their important trade links. Alternatively, opponents to the Argentina currency board have 
flagged the inherent inconsistency of the peg in light of the Argentina’s diversified trade partners. 
10 We used lagged oppeness to minimize potential endogeneity worries. The use of Frankel and Romer´s 
(1999) measure of openness yields similar results at the cost of fewer observations. We come back to the 
issue of endogeneity below. 
11 Note that the argument would indicate that, if most US neighbors tend to peg to the dollar, any individual 
neighbor would be tempted to do so, despite the fact that the US floats its currency. Hence, reference 
currency countries are excluded from the computation of this variable,. 
12 In both cases, given that prices tend to be more rigid to downward adjustment, the adjustment period is 
likely to be particularly long and taxing in the event of an adverse shock, the more so the less flexible 
domestic prices are. 
13 Haussman et al (1999), Lane (1995), and Frieden et al (2000) provide empirical evidence suggesting that, 
contrary to what could be expected, variability on terms of trade is positively related with the probability   6
growing trade flows and capital market integration (alternatively, as monetary shocks or 
inflation concerns become less of a priority) one should expect to see a trend towards 
more flexible regimes.  
 
To measure the importance of shocks on exchange rate regimes we include three     
variables to proxy for real aggregate demand shocks: the volatility of terms of trade, 
adjusted by openness to capture the relative importance of terms of trade shocks 
(VOLEXT), the volatility in the government consumption to GDP ratio (VOLGOV5), 
and the volatility in the investment to GDP ratio (VOLINV5). As a proxy for nominal 
disturbances we use the volatility of money velocity (VOLVELO5). All volatilities are 
measured as the standard deviation of annual values over the previous five years.  
 
 
II.b Modern Approaches to Exchange Rate Determination 
 
The “policy crutch” approach  
 
A large strand of literature has emphasized the credibility gains of adopting a peg regime. 
In particular, it has been argued that governments with a low inflation bias but low 
institutional credibility facing the uphill task of convincing the public of their 
commitment with nominal stability may adopt a peg as a “policy crutch” to tame 
inflationary expectations.
14 Thus, intimately related to the “policy crutch” approach is the 
link between institutional (and, in particular, government) strength and the exchange rate 
regime. As the argument goes, weak governments that are more vulnerable to 
“expansionary pressures” or “fiscal voracity” (i.e., pressures from fiscal groups with the 
power to extract fiscal transfers in times of windfall)
15 may choose to use a peg as way to 
fend off these pressures. 
 
We include three political variables to control for the strength of the government. Firsty, 
we measure strength directly as the fraction of seats held in congress by the government 
party or coalition (MAJ). A larger majority implies a stronger government that, according 
to the policy crutch argument, will be in a better position to implement a floating regime 
without being taken hostage by interest groups.
16  Accordingly, we expect the 
corresponding coefficient to be negative. 
 
Secondly, the years the incumbent administration has been in office (YRSOFF). We 
expect this variable to be positively correlated with the propensity to peg, as it may be an 
inverse measure of its capacity to impose executive decision on the other powers. In short 
                                                                                                                                                   
that a country select a peg. Haussman et al (1999) propose an explanation for this results. They argue that 
“fixed exchange rate regimes should result in deeper financial markets, which should be particularly 
important in economies facing important terms of trade shocks”. 
14 Hence, the usual association of this type of arguments in the literature with a “credibility” approach. 
Strictly speaking, this policy crutch does not achieve monetary credibility but rather presumes the lack of it 
and, by limiting the discretion of the policy maker, shies away from a costly credibility building process 
only achievable through a successful implementation of a discretionary policy. However, it may help pave 
the road to achieve fiscal credibility. 
15 See Tornell and Lane (1999). 
16 The underlying assumption is, of course, that representatives of the same party tend to vote together.    7
we use the years in office as a proxy for the natural process of wearing off of any 
government.  
 
Thirdly, we use a Herfindahl index of political parties, defined as the sum of the squared 
seat shares of all parties in the government.  The sign of the link between this variable 
and the strength of the government is not straightforward. In some setups, such as those 
collective action problems studied by Olson (1982, 1993) more atomization of political 
players implies a worsening of common pool problems leading to even larger incentives 
to extract from the common resources and therefore to even more suboptimal policies. In 
such specification a lower value of the herfindal should lead to a higher propensity to 
peg. Alternatively,  “voracity effect” stories, such as that in Tornell and Lane (1999) 
carry the opposite conclusion. As the number of players increases each group must 
reduce its appropriation rate to keep players within the formal economy (where their rents 
can be extracted) thus reducing the distortionary effects of redistributive policies. Thus, 
higher concentration, associated to stiffer political competition, should increase the 
propensity to fix.
17 At any rate, the relation between political concentration and weakness 
of the government is non-monotonic. As Tornell and Lane (1999) point out, it is only 
when there is more than one party involved when the voracity effect kicks in.
18 
 
Finally, we exploit an alternative political economy argument than associates short-run 
economic performance with the exchange rate regime. More precisely, countries that 
have experienced a contraction in recent years are likely to generate stronger political 
pressure to inflate in order to achieve more rapid growth (and higher inflation 
expectations in the process), and may be prone to peg in order to fend off these pressures 
or reduce the inflation bias.
19 To control for the temptation to inflate during recessions 
(which should be positively associated to the propensity to fix) we use a dummy 
(DUMCI1) that equals one whenever the growth rate in the preceding period is above the 




A key ingredient of the textbook Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch framework is the 
assumption of perfect capital mobility that implies international interest rate arbitrage 
across countries in the form of the uncovered interest parity. From this framework it 
follows that monetary policies in open economies cannot be aimed both at maintaining 
stable exchange rates and smoothing cyclical output fluctuations due to real shocks in the 
presence of capital mobility. This is usually referred to as the “impossible trinity”: the 
fact that policy makers can choose at most two out the three vortexes of the trinity: 
capital mobility, fixed exchange rates or monetary policy. 
 
In line with this, it has been argued that, as financial globalization deepened in the last 
decades, monetary policy became increasingly at odds with fixed exchange rates. This 
                                                 
17 In particular, the Herfindahl index tends to increase for bipartisan (or highly pollarized) governments. 
18 Many additional political variables were tested and found not to be significant, at the cost of losing a 
number of observations. 
19 See Edwards (1996). Again, the argument, which assumes that the government does not share the 
expansionary preferences of its constituency, can cut both ways: The government may be tempted to inflate 
after a protracted recession, abandoning the restrictive peg. As will be shown below, the sign of this 
variable differs between industrial and non-industrial countries.   8
argument underscores the so-called “bipolar view” of exchange rate regimes, according 
to which increased capital mobility has made intermediate regimes less viable in 
(financially open) industrial and emerging economies.
20 In addition, a rapid process of 
financial deepening and innovation (which typically has advanced pari passu with 
financial integration with international capital markets) has gradually reduced the 
effectiveness of capital controls, with the same consequences in terms of the monetary 
policy-exchange rate stability dilemma. 
 
We assess the empirical relevance of the impossible trinity approach in different ways. 
First, we include a dummy for emerging and industrial countries (FINDEV), which we 
take as a proxy for financial depht and  sophistication. We also control for the ratio of 
quasi money over money (QMM1, lagged to reduce the potential endogeneity of financial 
development) as an alternative  proxy for the degree of domestic financial depth.
21 In line 
with the impossible trinity view, we expect both variable to be associated with a lower 
propensity to peg.  
 
Financial Dollarization and Balance Sheet Effects 
 
Recent literature (most notably, Calvo, 1999 and 2000) has noted that balance sheet 
effects in financially dollarized economies may be critical to the choice of exchange rate 
regimes. In particular, countries with important (private or public) foreign liabilities may 
be more prone to fix (either de jure or de facto) due to the inherent currency imbalance 




While there is no readily available measure of financial dollarization for a broad sample 
of countries, it can be proxied by the lagged ratio of foreign liabilities in the domestic 
financial sector, relative to money stocks (FLM1).
23 According to this hypothesis we 
should expect higher liability dollarization to be positively associated with the probability 
of choosing a peg.  
 
 
III. Empirical Analysis 
 
The objective of this paper is to test the hypotheses presented in the previous section in a 
unified framework to assess the relative importance of each one of them. We run pooled 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Fischer (2001). The point has been raised earlier by Quirk (1994), among others. 
21 Some authors have argued that nominal (and, in particular, exchange rate stability) induces a process of 
financial deepening. 
22 It has to be noted that, while the real exchange rate adjustment in the event of a negative external shock 
cannot be avoided by the sustainement of a peg, the downward rigidity of prices may postpone the process 
over time, preventing a financial collapse. In addition, a nominal adjustment of the exchange rate is usually 
accompanied by an exchange rate overshooting that can only reinforce the negative financial implications. 
23 Kaminski and Schmukler’s (2001) capital controls index, a natural control for the impossible trinity 
hypothesis, proved not to be significantly correlated with the regime choice, possibly due to the fact that it 
covers only 28 countries. Alternative measures of financial dollarization (such Ize and Levy Yeyati’s 
(2000) dollarization ratio or Hausmann et al’s (2000) ability to pay measures, cover only a very limited 
number of countries.   9
logit regressions for an unbalanced panel data set of 183 countries over the post-Bretton 
Woods period (1974-1997)
24 on the set of controls discussed in the previous section.  
 
Our primary interest is to examine the relevance of different analytical approaches to the 
regime choice problem rather than the significance of individual variables. On the other 
hand, variables within each explanatory group may be highly correlated with each other. 
Accordingly, we focus the discussion on the joint relevance of each group of variables.
25  
 
Table 1, column (i), shows our baseline specification. Our dependent variable is a de 
facto fix  dummy (LYSFIX) that takes a value of one if a country is classified as a de 
facto fix and zero otherwise.
26 As can be seen, four out of the five groups of explanatory 
variables described above are found to be in line with our priors. In those cases, all 
variables display the expected sign and are jointly (and most of them individually) 
significant. The only exception are those regressors associated to the nominal-real 
tradeoff, which are patently irrelevant:  While the signs are as expected, the variables are 
neither individually nor jointly significant. 
 
Note that the results for the seem to support the view that pegs are associated to weaker 
governments. In particular, the signs of the coefficients for the Herfindahl index provide 
support to the “voracity effect” argument. On the other hand, note that FINDEV could 
also be considered as a proxy for capital liberalization, in which case the negative 
coefficient for this variable could be interpreted as indicating that greater capital mobility 
increases the probability of choosing a float. 
 
Overall, the model displays a good level of accuracy in predicting actual regimes. It 




Columns (ii) and (iii) show the same baseline specification but splitting the sample into 
industrial and non-industrial countries, revealing some notable differences between the 
two. For the industrial sample, while all the nominal-real tradeoff variables have now the 
correct sign and are statistically significant, both impossible trinity and balance sheet 
effects lose their explanatory power. On the other hand, neighbors’ average regime is no 
longer significant. These results indicate that industrial countries’ exchange rate policy is 
not constrained by financial variables. Indeed, the temptation to inflate dummy reverses 
its sign, suggesting that countries undergoing a recession tend to adopt more flexible 
exchange rate policies to revive the economy. In turn, this increased independence leads 
to a more relevant role of the exchange rate as shock absorber, as captured by the 
nominal-real tradeoff. Political variables appear to be slightly weaker, but their overall 
significance remains high. 
 
                                                 
24 Political variables are not available after 1997. 
25 P-values corresponding to the joint Wald tests for each group are presented at the bottom. 
26 The tables also report two measures of goodness of fit: the pseudo R2 (pseudoR2 = 1-L/L0 where L is the 
likelihood under the original model and L0 the likelihood value for a model with only a constant) and a 
Wald test of joint significance of the model. 
27 On the other hand, the Chow test yields a Chi-square value of 400, thus strongly rejecting the hypothesis 
that the specification is nonsignificant.    10
The subsample of non-industrial countries (column iii) basically replicates the results for 
the full sample, although OCA variables appear to be somewhat weaker than for 
industrial economies.  
 
One could argue that in the 90s, characterized by increasing financial liberalization and 
globalization, impossible trinity variables took over other explanatory factors, particularly 
in non-industrial economies. To explore this hypothesis, in columns iv and v we rerun the 
baseline specification splitting the sample in two periods: 1974-1980 and 1981-1990. We 
find no significant difference in the influence of each group of variables. Similarly, the 
main results hold when the test is restricted to low income (less developed) countries. 
(column vi). 
 
Table 2, replicates the previous tests using the IMF-based de jure classification.
28 As 
expected, while the results are less satisfactory than for the de facto classification, the 
main messages remain unaltered. OCA theory variables are still significant and of the 
correct sign, and so is the effect of the remaining variables.
29 The salient exception is the 
variability of money velocity, which is significant and negative, contradicting our prior.   
 
The apparent differences between the results derived from each classification bears the 
question of whether and to what extent our findings are driven by a particular 
classification criterion. However, a simple and rather crude test shows that the de jure 
approach yields basically the same results once obviously misclassified observations are 
excluded. To do that, we restrict the de jure fix group to relatively uncontroversial cases, 
defined as those for which the average monthly variation of the nominal exchange rate 
does not exceed 0.1%.
30 Once misclassified fixes (146 out of 1122 observations) are 
grouped with non-fixes, most of the original results reappear. In particular, the coefficient 
for the velocity variable is no longer significant, and the financial dollarization variables 
are again significantly correlated with the propensity to peg. 
 
Global Trends  
 
Our empirical specification allows for time effects through the inclusion of yearly 
dummies. Figure 1 shows the values for the yearly dummies throughout our sample both 
for our baseline specification based on the de jure classification, as well as for the 
specification using the IMF’s de jure classification. 
 
The value of these dummies can be interpreted as the impact of common global trends or 
changes in global conditions on the choice of regime. As can be seen, there is no 
identifiable pattern when using the de facto classification, indicating that our set of 
determinants capture most of the relevant factors underpinning exchange rate choices. 
However when using the IMF classification, we find that global conditions appear to 
suggest a higher propensity to float. This result is consistent with the fact that, while the 
late 1970s and 1980s were plagued by fixed but frequently realigned (or collapsed) 
regimes, during the 90s (partly as a result of that) an increasing number of countries that 
                                                 
28 For the sake of comparison, the IMF regression includes only those observations that are also classified 
under the de facto methodology. If we do not restrict the sample, the results are very similar with the 
difference that the SIZE coefficient becomes significantly negative.  
29 Some individual variables display the wrong sign, although in those cases they cease to be significant. 
30 Alternative (and reasonable low) cut-off points yield identical results.   11
reported flexible regimes tend to behave in practice closer to a peg (a phenomenon 
usually referred to as “fear of floating”).
31 
 
To illustrate this bias, we recovered the time trend that results from rerunning the 
regression using the “revised” de jure classification based on uncontroversial pegs. As 
can be seen, while the time trend still exhibits a downward trend, its shape follows the de 
facto trend much more closely. 
 
 
IV. Extensions and robustness checks 
 
Our baseline specification included what we believe are the most essential variables that 
the theory has identified as being related to exchange rate regimes. However, the 
interpretation of many of these variables is not free of complications. In particular in this 
section we want to discuss two extensions: further strengthening the scope of political 
variables and evaluating potential endogeneity problems.  
 
Policy Crutch vs. Sustainability  
 
To be sure, the literature does not provide an unambiguous answer regarding the sign of 
the link between political strength and regimes. Indeed, our policy crutch effect can be 
easily reversed: Weak or unstable governments could be associated with larger deficits 
(or lower ability to reduce it, if needed), suggesting that a peg could be more difficult to 
sustain. This is particularly true in the presence of wars or civil unrest,
32 but could be 
extended to episodes of political turmoil.  
 
More in general, this “sustainability effect” would associate a weaker government with 
the collapse of existing pegs or the inability to launch a credible one, thus finding 
government strength positively correlated with pegs and not the other way around. For 
example, the fact that the output cycle variable does not come in significant may be a 
reflection of this tradeoff between commitment and sustainability, as one could argue that 
a recession may fuel political pressures in favor of a floating regime.
33 More in general, if 
by this argument pegs under weak governments are less likely to be successful, then our 
estimates for the political strength variables may be biased downward. 
 
More controversial is the interpretation of the link of the exchange rate regime and the 
inflation rate. One could argue, following Edwards (1996) and Frieden et al (2000), that 
countries with moderate to high inflation and (partly as a result of this) low credibility on 
the inflation front have incentives to use the exchange rate as an anchor (as witness the 
experiences with diverse tablitas in the 80s or, more recently, the Argentine currency 
board). Thus, the choice of a peg as a policy crutch may be associated with previous 
failed attempts at lowering inflation (i.e., with a history of high inflation prior to the 
                                                 
31 Thus, the sign of the de facto-de jure mismatch tends to be correlated with a time trend. See Levy Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger (2002) for an empirical discussion of this point.  
32 However, a qualitative index of civil wars and political assesinations was found not to be significant 
when added to the baseline. 
33 Note that this implicitely assumes the convetional wisdom view of devaluations as expansionary, a fact 
for which the empirical evidence is rather mixed.   12
choice of the peg).
34 However, persistent high inflation creates pressures on the exchange 
rate market that may force monetary authorities to float (either voluntarily or as a 
consequence of a currency crisis). Thus, a negative inflation-exchange rate rigidity 
correlation suffers from a potential identification problem, and even the relationship itself 
is under question.  
 
There is no easy option to solve this problem, but there are several partial ways to address 
it. On the one hand, it is reasonable to assume that the incidence of past inflation on the 
current propensity to peg follows a nonlinear relationship, increasing as inflation reaches 
higher (and more unmanageable) levels.
35 Accordingly, it is useful to differentiate 
moderate from high inflation (and hyperinflation) episodes, as the latter have typically 
shown a stronger real effect and, as a result, have given way to rapid policy reactions.  
 
In light of the above, to control for the sustainability of the peg, we add to our baseline 
specification the log of the inflation rate (INF1),
36 as well as a dummy for high inflation 
(defined as an annual inflation rate exceeding 150%, HIGH1), both lagged one period to 
reduce endogeneity. While we do not have a prior regarding the net effect of inflation per 
se, we expect a high inflation to increase the propensity to peg and a moderate inflation to 
increase the pressures to float.  
 
An additional control for sustainability is drawn from a number of papers that have 
emphasized the role of international reserves as “life jackets” for emerging markets prone 
to suffer sudden reversals in the demand for local assets.
37 According to this line of 
reasoning, a high level of reserves is often perceived as a necessary condition for the 
credibility and sustainability of a peg in developing economies, as they function as a 
standard insurance mechanism, deterring currency speculation or reducing the incidence 
of self-fulfilling currency runs.  Accordingly, we include (lagged) international reserves 
relative to base money (RESBASE1), which we expect to be positively correlated with 
the probability of a country adopting (and maintaining) a peg. 
 
The results are reported in Table 3 (baseline results are reproduced for comparison). 
Columns (i) and (ii) indicate that while past inflation is generally negatively correlated 
with the propensity to peg (suggesting that chronic inflation renders the peg ultimately 
unsustainable), a high inflation episode increases the probability of pegging, a link 
consistent with the policy crutch view of a peg as a last resort shortcut to nominal 
stability. In turn, the reserves variable is significantly and positively correlated with the 
propensity to peg, in line with the sustainability argument.  
 
Thus, factors associated with the capacity of the government to defend the regime seem 
to exert a non-neglegible influence on the probability of having a peg at any point in time, 
suggesting that the regime is not only determined by choice but it may also be forced by 
the circumstances. However, controlling for sustainability of the regime leaves the 
political variables virtually unaffected, confirming the underlying mechanism by which 
                                                 
34 There is empirical evidence that (long-lasting) pegs have been successful at reducing inflation. See, 
among others, Ghosh et al. (1997) and Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001b). 
35 The nonlinear effect of inflation on real variables has been documented in Sarel (1995). 
36 We use INF1=log (1+ πt-1). 
37 Both phenomena are thoroughly discussed by Calvo (1999), and Hausmann et al.  (2000), among others.   13
they affect the exchange rate regime, namely, that weaker governments with a dearer 




Our regressions have shown the relevance of a number of variables on the choice of 
regime. However, while most of these variables are not subject to endogeneity (size, area, 
political fundamentals and the volatility measures), the significance of some of them may 
be reflecting a possible reverse causality, as there is ground to think that, to some extent, 
they may be influenced by the exchange rate policy. 
 
Take for example, the inflation rate that we discussed above. As documented in Ghosh et 
al (1997, and 2002) for de jure regimes and in Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001b) for 
de facto regimes, fixed exchange rates are known to lead to lower inflation rates. In order 
to control for this endogeneity factor we rerun in Table 4 the regression of column iv of 
Table 3, but measuring inflation now as the average inflation of the previous three years. 
Such measure should be substantially less influenced by endogeneity problems, and, as 
expected, the result remains, but weakens substantially.  
 
Regarding the measures of openness and concentration of trade, it is important to note 
that the literature offers an alternatively story for the openness-exchange rate regime 
connection: Exchange rate stability (such as that provided by a peg) by reducing bilateral 
exchange rate volatility, may foster trade and, in turn, openness and concentration of 
trade. Thus, a positive association between openness and fixed exchange rates may reflect 
the reverse causality. Empirical studies supporting this hypothesis include Rose (1999),  
Rose and Frankel (2002), Rose and Glick (2002), and Rose and Van Wincoop (2001) .
38 
In order to control for this, we rerun in column ii our baseline specification using the 
initial values (those corresponding to year 1974) for concentration of trade (SHTRADE1) 
and openness (OPEN1). As can be seen both variables come in significantly with the 
expected signs and do not alter the other results.  
 
Financial development has also been associated to exchange rate regimes. The argument 
is that the fixing of the exchange rate by reducing exchange rate volatility may foster 
financial development. However if the correlation between our measures of financial 
development and the exchange rate regime would be due to this reverse causality then we 
should expect a positive relation between financial development variables and pegged 
exchange rate regimes. Yet we find exactly the opposite result, indicating that, if such 
endogeneity problem is present, it is more than offset by the effect of financial 
development on the choice of regime.  
 
Another potential concern is associated with the omission of relevant variables that are in 
turn correlated with the included regressors, therefore leading to spurious results. The 
most general way to control for (country-specific) omitted variables is by introducing 
country fixed effects in the regression that control for all those excluded factors that may 
be correlated with the right-hand side variables. Unfortunately, the introduction of fixed 
effects in our case has several drawbacks. On the one hand, by restricting information to 
within-country variability, it limits dramatically the usefulness of the data. And, as long 
                                                 
38 See also the criticism in Persson (2001).   14
as we are interested in the long-run determinants of regime choices, we do not want to 
discard the cross-country comparison of time-invariant pegs and floats (between-country 
variability). With fixed effects, this cross-country result is lost, as the logit estimation 
uses the fixed effect to match the probability of the observed outcome for that country 
regardless of the coefficients on the other variables thus dumping all variables without 
within-country volatility and all data for countries for which the chosen regime does not 
change. This notwithstanding, we report in column (iii) the estimates from a fixed effect 
estimation of the baseline specification. As can be seen, most results remain unchanged. 
The only relevant discrepancy is in the variables associated with the nominal-real 
tradeoff, which, although jointly significant, do not have the expected sign. Overall, 





V. Fear of pegging and fear of floating  
 
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) define fear of floating as de jure floaters that intervened in the 
market to smooth the fluctuations of the nominal rate. Paraphrasing them, Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger (2002) define fear of pegging as having a de facto peg but claiming 
another regime. Fear of floating is associated with the objective of limiting the variability 
of the exchange rate in a globalized financial environment, due to the combination of 
substantial external volatility, balance sheet effects and a large pass-through coefficient. 
Similarly, fear of pegging can be interpreted as a way of reducing the risks of speculative 
attacks on conventional pegs. In particular, as the latter gained a bad reputation after the 
succession of collapses in the late 1990s, countries that, for whatever reasons target the 
exchange rate may report a managed float as a way to avoid a commitment with a fixed 
parity and the reputational cost of being unable to defend it. 
 
Table 5 shows how our five group of regime determinants fare for the cases of fear of 
floating and fear of pegging. For the former, we restrict our universe to de jure floats. The 
results should then be interpreted as the influence of our controls on the propensity to peg 
de facto within the group of reported floaters. In turn, to explore the determinants of fear 
of pegging we focus on the propensity of actual fixers not to report a fix. Thus, our 
dependent variable is a de jure non-fix dummy over the de facto fix sample. Our 
regressors are the same as in our baseline specification. Our conjecture is that our choice 
set of regime determinants should also account for the numerous deviations between 
reported and actual regimes.  
 
Indeed, we find that fear of floating depends critically on a few variables, in line with our 
priors. In particular, column (i)  shows that the presence of fear of floating is significantly 
associated to balance sheet effects, and to monetary shocks that are itself associated with 
sharp changes in the nominal exchange rate. On the other hand we find that small open 
economies (characterized by a larger pass-through coefficient) are more prone to exhibit 
fear of floating as suggested by the negative coefficient on AREA and positive coefficient 
on OPEN1 (albeit not significant). Somewhat surprisingly, however, political variables 
do not seem to play a significant role.  
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Regarding fear of pegging, we find that it is correlated with the prevalence of de facto 
floats in the region. This is consistent with the evidence that exchange rate variability in 
neighbouring countries is often the trigger to speculative attacks on the home currency. 
Thus, frequently changing bilateral exchange rates with the main trade partners opens a 
vulnerability that authorities may want to avoid by preserving the option to modify the 
exchange rate without major regime disruptions. Fear of pegging is also correlated with 
trade diversification, an alternative measure of exposure to external shocks that affect the 
exchange rate vis à vis the peg currency. 
 
On the other hand, fear of pegging is associated with financially developed economies 
with deep financial markets that are less easily controlled, in line with the view of that 
economies shy away from explicit commitments to a fixed parity when they are more 
prone to successful speculative attacks.  
 
Political variables also provide insights as to why there is fear of pegging. On the one 
hand the negative sign of YRSOFF indicates that political weakness is associated to the 
need to state a fixed regime, a result which is in line with the higher prevalence of fixers 
among long-tenured governments. On the other, the negative sign on MAJ suggests that 
the stronger governments are more prone to report a peg when they are running it. Thus, 
the evidence is not conclusive about the link beween political strength and fear of 





The evidence presented in this paper indicates that the choice of exchange rate regimes 
can be traced back to a relatively tight group of political, geographical and financial 
variables that, reassuringly, closely reflect underlying theories of regime determination. 
Not surprisingly, some views on exchange rate regimes are more appropriate for some 
countries than for others, depending the country’s characteristics.  
 
Understanding the role played by country-specific factors in the determination of 
exchange rate regimes is essential to assess the convenience and the ultimate success of 
any attempt to induce a country to adopt a float or a fix in a given context. In some cases, 
the recommendation may suggest a regime the country is naturally prone to choose. But if 
the country’s fundamentals suggest otherwise, an unqualified advice is likely to lead to a 
regime reversal down the road.  
 
   16
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Table 1: Baseline Specification 
 
 
 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V)  (VI) 
  Baseline  Industrial  Non-industrial  After 90's  Before 90's  gdppc< 
mean 
AREA -0.316***  -0.714* -0.243  -0.334***  -0.310***  -0.168 
  (0.060) (0.377) (0.193) (0.069) (0.089)  (0.364) 
SIZE -5.252**  -5.315  15.890  -9.817***  -1.890  -3.963 
  (2.158) (3.267) (16.364)  (3.474) (2.565)  (24.321) 
OPEN1 1.376*  28.154***  1.826** 1.703  1.403  4.765*** 
  (0.764) (7.294) (0.850) (1.116) (1.147)  (1.402) 
SHTRADE1 1.739***  -18.640*  2.607***  1.469*  2.271**  1.408 
  (0.610) (11.231)  (0.668) (0.890) (0.918)  (0.950) 
LYSAVG2  0.775*  -26.544**  0.548 0.818 0.370  0.635 
  (0.409) (11.293)  (0.546) (0.641) (0.592)  (0.694) 
VOLEXT  -1.507 -33.009  -0.758 -3.123 2.272  -8.038** 
  (2.220) (28.327)  (2.312) (3.390) (4.075)  (3.815) 
VOLGOV5 -0.459  -93.455***  -0.295  0.173  -1.161  -0.694 
  (0.439) (26.615)  (0.391) (0.491) (0.862)  (0.590) 
VOLINV5 3.134  -18.013  3.514  -1.049  4.183  -3.563 
  (4.225) (29.818)  (4.353) (5.631) (5.970)  (5.056) 
VOLVELO5 0.000  1.500***  0.000  -0.030**  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000) (0.570) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000)  (0.000) 















  (0.011) (0.078) (0.012) (0.019) (0.015)  (0.014) 















  (1.096) (27.749)  (1.226) (2.126) (1.387)  (1.528) 
DUMCI1 -0.145  1.292**  -0.176  -0.840*** 0.434*  -0.159 
  (0.155) (0.637) (0.182) (0.244) (0.224)  (0.249) 
FINDEV -0.478**   -1.198***  0.119  -0.955***  -1.126*** 
  (0.202)   (0.250) (0.301) (0.275)  (0.303) 
QMM1  -0.462*** -0.214  -0.377*** -0.571*** -0.339***  -0.369** 
  (0.070) (0.421) (0.088) (0.101) (0.094)  (0.161) 
FLM1  1.518*** -0.223  1.330*** 1.679*** 1.233***  1.664** 
  (0.181) (0.702) (0.391) (0.271) (0.258)  (0.690) 
Obs.  1122  260 853 471 651  523 
Pseudo  R2    0.258 0.656 0.265 0.253 0.297  0.257 
Test OCA 
 
Test nominal vs 
real 
 





























































































Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Statistics  are  chi-squared  distributed        
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Table 2: De Jure and De Facto Classification 
 
 
 (I)  (II)  (III) 
  Baseline  De Jure Classification  Uncontroversials 
AREA -0.316***  -0.024 -0.117 
 (0.060)  (0.086)  (0.127) 
SIZE -5.252**  -32.613***  -42.360*** 
 (2.158)  (7.708)  (14.178) 
OPEN1 1.376*  1.611** 0.930 
 (0.764)  (0.819)  (0.865) 
SHTRADE1 1.739***  1.430**  2.482*** 
 (0.610)  (0.574)  (0.732) 
LYSAVG2 0.775*  2.614***  2.583*** 
 (0.409)  (0.464)  (0.534) 
VOLEXT -1.507  0.265  -2.066 
 (2.220)  (2.488)  (2.670) 
VOLGOV5 -0.459  0.193  -1.686 
 (0.439)  (0.377)  (1.152) 
VOLINV5 3.134  5.446  1.964 
 (4.225)  (4.304)  (4.519) 
VOLVELO5 0.000  -0.000**  -0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 









 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
HERF 3.580***  -1.968 1.757 
 (1.362)  (1.295)  (1.542) 









 (0.155)  (0.165)  (0.187) 
FINDEV -0.478** -0.680***  -1.406*** 
 (0.202)  (0.215)  (0.274) 
QMM1 -0.462***  0.022  -0.340*** 
 (0.070)  (0.042)  (0.086) 
FLM1 1.518***  0.159  1.559*** 
 (0.181)  (0.103)  (0.297) 
Obs. 1122 1122 1122 
Pseudo R2  0.258  0.346  0.394 
Correctly classified  72.55%  77.99%  80.66% 
Test OCA 
 
Test nominal vs real 
 
Test policy crutch 
 
Test impossible trinity 
 




































Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Statistics are chi-squared distributed         
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Table 3: Extension: Sustainability 
 
 
 (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
 Baseline  w/Reserves  w/Inflation  w/Reserves  +  Inflation 
AREA  -0.316*** -0.282*** -0.318*** -0.253*** 
  (0.060) (0.058) (0.067) (0.070) 
SIZE  -5.252** -5.673** -6.444***  -7.093** 
  (2.158) (2.593) (2.292) (2.791) 
OPEN1  1.376* 1.530* 0.583  0.778 
  (0.764) (0.792) (0.791) (0.826) 
SHTRADE1  1.739*** 1.799*** 1.948*** 2.061*** 
  (0.610) (0.614) (0.664) (0.670) 
LYSAVG2 0.775*  0.906**  0.762*  0.904** 
  (0.409) (0.429) (0.400) (0.427) 
VOLEXT  -1.507 -2.538 -0.287 -1.350 
  (2.220) (2.326) (2.184) (2.375) 
VOLGOV5  -0.459 -0.589 0.715  0.646 
  (0.439) (0.510) (0.556) (0.536) 
VOLINV5  3.134 1.433 6.566 4.507 
  (4.225) (4.451) (4.057) (4.275) 
VOLVELO5  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MAJ  -1.307*** -1.123*** -1.530*** -1.345*** 
  (0.440) (0.434) (0.433) (0.431) 
YRSOFF 0.031*** 0.042*** 0.022**  0.033*** 
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) 
HERF 3.580***  2.699**  4.387***  3.496*** 
  (1.362) (1.343) (1.332) (1.325) 











  (0.155) (0.160) (0.157) (0.164) 
INF1    -3.477***  -3.353*** 
   (0.941)  (0.850) 







  (0.107)   (0.125) 
QMM1  -0.462*** -0.590*** -0.437*** -0.577*** 
  (0.070) (0.084) (0.073) (0.090) 
FINDEV -0.478** -0.941***  -0.402** -0.872*** 
  (0.202) (0.218) (0.203) (0.220) 
FLM1  1.518*** 1.539*** 1.409*** 1.457*** 
  (0.181) (0.186) (0.189) (0.197) 
Obs. 1122 1109 1096 1083 
Pseudo  R2  0.258 0.286 0.277 0.305 
Test OCA 
 
Test nominal vs real 
 
 
Test policy crutch 
 
 
Test impossible trinity 
 
 
































































Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Statistics are chi-squared distributed         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 4: Endogeneity 
 
 
 (I)  (II)  (III) 
 w/lagged  inflation  w/lagged trade  Fixed effects 
AREA  -0.312*** -0.364***  
  (0.062) (0.067)  
SIZE -6.314***  -3.232  -11.126 
  (2.253) (2.127) (13.713) 
OPEN1 0.530    4.545** 
 (0.918)   (2.087) 
OPEN1I   1.914***   
  (0.699)   
SHTRADE1 1.669***    1.750 
 (0.644)   (1.316) 
SHTRADEI   3.350***   
  (0.739)   
LYSAVG2 0.704*  0.612  3.564*** 
  (0.393) (0.421) (0.764) 
VOLEXT  -2.009 -1.659 -4.050 
  (2.635) (1.833) (3.419) 
VOLGOV5 1.444  -0.442  -0.245 
  (0.955) (0.480) (0.606) 
VOLINV5 3.901  11.095**  14.438** 
  (3.875) (4.613) (7.216) 
VOLVELO5 0.000  -0.000  0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MAJ  -1.541*** -1.563*** -1.913** 
  (0.439) (0.459) (0.769) 
YRSOFF 0.026**  0.032*** 0.040* 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.024) 
HERF 4.359***  3.607**  -2.465 
  (1.362) (1.409) (2.614) 
HERF2 -1.898* -1.241  3.970* 
  (1.122) (1.116) (2.187) 
DUMCI1  -0.187 -0.249 -0.390 
  (0.160) (0.161) (0.239) 
INF3 -3.195*     
 (1.873)    
HIGH 1.947     
 (1.378)    
FINDEV  -0.296 -0.254  
  (0.204) (0.205)  
QMM1  -0.394*** -0.417*** -0.559*** 
  (0.076) (0.070) (0.191) 
FLM1  1.311*** 1.498*** 1.697*** 
  (0.188) (0.184) (0.513) 
Obs. 1038 1076 794 
Number of code      53 
Pseudo  R2  0.255 0.278 0.248 
Test OCA 
 
Test nominal vs real 
 
Test policy crutch 
 
Test impossible trinity 
 




































Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Statistics are chi-squared distributed     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 5: Fear of floating and Fear of pegging   
 
 
 (I)  (II) 
  Fear of floating  Fear of pegging 
AREA -0.205**  1.142*** 
 (0.096)  (0.365) 
SIZE -9.818*  33.858*** 
 (5.244)  (12.104) 
OPEN1 3.805  0.887 
 (2.421)  (1.809) 
SHTRADE1 -0.280  -3.362*** 
 (1.538)  (1.165) 
LYSAVG2 -1.980  -4.451*** 
 (1.351)  (0.988) 
VOLEXT 4.760  6.011 
 (6.096)  (3.971) 
VOLGOV5 6.914**  0.817 
 (2.904)  (1.206) 
VOLINV5 -3.948  -13.500 
 (8.119)  (8.768) 
VOLVELO5 0.474**  0.000 
 (0.222)  (0.000) 
MAJ -1.426  -2.677* 
 (1.316)  (1.485) 
YRSOFF 0.078  -0.050** 
 (0.064)  (0.022) 
HERF -7.042 3.213 
 (4.925)  (2.469) 
HERF2 6.000  -0.746 
 (4.558)  (2.088) 
DUMCI1 -0.289  -0.155 
 (0.478)  (0.307) 
FINDEV 0.133  1.574*** 
 (0.672)  (0.451) 
QMM1 0.110  -0.120 
 (0.238)  (0.129) 
FLM1 1.244**  -0.158 
 (0.563)  (0.096) 
Obs. 221  510 
Pseudo R2  0.443  0.481 
Test OCA 
 
Test nominal vs real 
 
Test policy crutch 
 
Test impossible trinity 
 

























Robust standard errors in parentheses 
Statistics are chi-squared distributed     










































































Variables  Definition and Source 
AREA  Land area (sq km) (Source: WDI,; variable AG.LND.TOTL.K2) 
DUMCI1  Dummy variable for economic cycle ( 1 if  the GDP growth rate in the 
preceding period is above the long-run growth rate). (Source:WEO-IMF 
Series code:W914NGDP_R) 
FINDEV  Dummy variable for emerging and industrial countries. 
FLM1  Lagged Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money (Source: IMF  line 16C/ 
line 34). 
HERF  The sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in the government 
(Source: Database of Political Institutions. Version 2.0) 
HERF2  Square of HERF.  





Lagged logarithm of one plus the annual percentage change in Consumer 
Price Index (Source: IMF line 64). 
Average inflation of the previous three years.(Source: IMF line 64) 
LYSAVG  Average de facto exchange rate regime of the region (Source: Levy 
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) 
MAJ  Fraction of seats held by the government.  It is calculated by dividing the 
number of government seats by total (government plus opposition) seats. 
(Source: Database of Political Institutions. Version 2.0) 
OPEN1  Lagged Openness, (ratio of [export + import]/2 to GDP) (Source: IMF 
(line 90c+line 98c)/2/ line 99b). 
QMM1  Lagged Ratio of Quasi Money over Money (Source: IMF line 35/ line 34) 
RESBASE1  Lagged Ratio of International Reserves to monetary base (Source: IMF 
line 11/line 14). 
RESBASEI  1974  Ratio of International Reserves to monetary base (Source: IMF ). 
SHTRADE1  Lagged share of trade with the largest trading partner: exports to the 
largest trading partner as a share of total exports (Source: IMF-Direction 
of Trade Statistics). 
SHTRADEI  1974 share of trade with the largest trading partner: exports to the largest 
trading partner as a share of total exports (Source: IMF-Direction of 
Trade Statistics). 
SIZE  GDP in dollars over USA GDP (Source: WDI Series Code: 
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD). 
VOLEXT  Standard deviation of the logarithm of terms of trade over the previous 
five years adjusted by openness (Source: WDI Series Code: 
NY.EXP.CAPM.KN) 
VOLGOV5  Standard deviation of the government consumption to GDP ratio over the 
previous five years. (Source: IMF line 82/ line 99b) 
VOLINV5  Standard deviation of the investment to GDP ratio over the previous five 
years. (Source: IMF line 93e/line 99b) 
VOLVELO5  Standard deviation of  money velocity over the previous five years. 
(Source: IMF  line 99b/ line 34)) 
YRSOFF  Years the incumbent administration has been in office. 
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